Bad Roads: ARS 12-820.03 - Adequacy of Warning Signs
Arizona has a complex and deceptive scheme concerning its immunity for hazardous roads. My firm recently took on a case where our client was severely injured and her husband killed when they were making a left-hand turn at a very dangerous intersection. Although the State has since prohibited left-hand turns at this intersection, there was a long history of collisions at the intersection, including another fatality, and it was clear the hazards were ignored until my client and her husband’s tragic and fatal incident.
Turning to the statutory scheme, however, it might appear that the State is generally immune from liability for planning or designing a dangerous road. ARS 12-820.03 states:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for an injury arising out of a plan or design for construction or maintenance of or improvement to highways, roads, streets, bridges, or rights-of-way if the plan or design is prepared in conformance with generally accepted engineering or design standards in effect at the time of the preparation of the plan or design, provided, however, that reasonably adequate warning shall be given as to any unreasonably dangerous hazards which would allow the public to take suitable precautions.
Notwithstanding this, the State is actually still responsible for ensuring our roads are safe — but in ways that may not be so obvious. It mainly involves “adequate signage.”
Distilled to its essential elements, ARS 12-820.03 provides that State is only liable if (a) a road is not “planned or designed” in conformance with contemporaneous “generally accepted engineering or design standards” or (b) the State fails to provide “reasonably adequate warning” of an unreasonable hazard. Consider a dangerous intersection, for example. Set aside whether the intersection is “planned or designed” in accordance with generally accepted engineering and design standards (since this is often the case), it’s often the second exception to immunity in ARS 12-820.03 that will determine whether the plaintiff has a viable cause of action.
This section requires the State “give ‘reasonably adequate warning’ of unreasonably dangerous street hazards even where the [State] is not responsible for the design defect creating the hazard.” Galati v. Lake Havasu City, 186 Ariz. 131, 920 P.2d 11 (App. 1996) (“A.R.S. section 12-820.03 (1) appears to require a city to give ‘reasonably adequate warning’ of unreasonably dangerous street hazards even where the city is not responsible for the design defect creating the hazard.”). But what is a “warning,” exactly? And what is an “unreasonably inadequate warning”?
In Galati the Court of Appeals held:
We find issues of material fact regarding the existence and adequacy of signs at the accident site on the day of the accident. Galati’s expert testified at his deposition that the danger posed by McCulloch Boulevard’s inadequate design could have been reduced by a lower, 15 miles per hour speed limit, a stop sign, or warning signs. The City admitted that the posted speed limit at the time of the accident was 35 miles per hour, but submitted a sign log purporting to show that signs warning of the dip and curve and an advisory 25 miles per hour sign existed at the site on the day of the accident. We conclude that the issue of the adequacy of the existing signs is an issue of fact for the jury.
As you can see, the Court of Appeals considers the adequacy of the warnings based upon not just their existence and theoretical content, but actually considers the quantitative limitation on speed as part of the adequacy of the “warning.” That is, a speed limit sign can be considered a “warning” to protect motorists of unreasonable hazards and, if set too high, can be “inadequate.” Of course, this necessarily means that the quantitative limitation on speed is also not part of the “plan or design” of the roadway since the State is immune from those types of claims. Likewise, Galati also necessarily holds the existence of a stop sign is not part of the “plan or design” of the roadway and that a stop sign is also a “warning” which, if not given, can be “inadequate.”
Think about that for a moment. A speed limit or stop sign is considered a potential “warning”? A potential warning of an “unreasonably dangerous hazard”? Why is the speed limit or existence of a stop sign not part of the “plan or design” of a roadway? After all, the speed limit itself is typically a function of traffic studies — doesn’t that sound like the planning or designing of the roadway? And the existence of a stop sign is certainly something that one might consider in connection with planning or designing a roadway, right?
And if you think that’s the end of it, how about the placement of the signs? That was my client’s case. Although there were some other issues as well, my client’s case mainly involved a roadway where the stop sign and accompanying “stop bar” was too far away from the intersection. If a typical vehicle stopped at the existing stop bar, as required, the vehicle did not have enough time to safely clear the intersection of oncoming traffic.
Could it be that the State was immune from liability under such circumstances? That was not my position. My argument was that, just as a speed limit sign, allowing for speeds that are too great, can be an “inadequate warning,” a stop sign placed 1 mile prior to an intersection was clearly an “inadequate warning.” Therefore, it followed, a stop sign and stop bar placed an “excessive distance” from an intersection (which may be just a few feet) was also an “inadequate warning.” The State was, indeed, responsible for the placement of its signs.
Please feel free to contact me if you are interested in learning more.
